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ABSTRACT
The union membership in the United States has declined
since 1970 and reached less than 14 percent of labor force
in 1989. A number of studies have been conducted to examine
the causes of decline in union membership. Among researchers
nearly all believed that structural change in the United
States economy plays an important role. The theories of
managerial opposition and substitution of government and
employers for unions were also supported by many
researchers. This study examined the effect of the number of
female and part-time workers from the labor force as a
measure for structural change in the economy. The number of
unfair labor practice filed by the union members was used to
show the effect of managerial opposition. For indicating the
effect of governmental substitution, the number of workers
that received

unemployment insurance from government were

chosen. In addition, direct foreign investment as a proxy
for foreign competition and a dummy variable for political
party of the president to show the administration and
legislation effect were used.
Three multiple regressions were performed, using data
from 1961-1989. Data were obtained from Economic Report of
President, Statistical Abstract of the ·united States, and
Monthly Labor Review. In the first regression model the
absolute value of the independent variables were used. The

results showed that only the absolute values of part-time
workers and the president's political party have negative
and significant effects on the percentage of unionized
workers to the labor force. The effect of percentage change
of the independent variables on the percentage of unionized
workers in labor force is shown in the results of the second
regression model. The results imply that there is a negative
but not significant relationship of percentage of female and
part-time workers to labor force and the president's
political party with the dependent variable. There is also a
significant effect of direct foreign investment in the
United States and the insured unemployed to unemployment
ratio on the dependent variable. Because of the high degree
of intercorrelation between the percentage of female and
part-time workers to total labor force the third regression
model was run without the variable of part-time workers. The
results showed a negative and significant effect of
percentage female workers to labor force on the percentage
of unionized workers to labor force. In addition, percentage
change of direct foreign investment and the number of
insured unemployed divided by total unemployment have
positive and significant effect on the percentage of the
unionized workers.
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INTRODUCTION

Unions are the principal institution of workers in
modern capitalistic societies. For over 200 years since the
days of Adam Smith, economists have studied the social and
political effects of unionism. In addition, numerous studies
have been conducted on the factors which may have an

effect

on unions' bargaining power.
Generally, it is important to gain a basic
understanding of the origin of labor unions. One historical
view is that unions are essentially the off spring of
industrialization. That is, most preindustrial workers were
self-sufficient in that they were simultaneously

employ~rs

and employees (Campbell & Brue, 1992). Industrialization
changed this system and made many workers dependent upon
factory owners for employment and income. Competitive
pressure in the

pr~duct

market of ten forced employers to pay

low wages to employees, work them long and hard, provide
minimal job benefits, and terminate their employment when
market demand for their product decreased. In short,
industrialization forced workers into a position where their
earnings, working condition, and security were beyond their
control as individuals. As a result, in order to protect
their interests workers formed unions to bargain
collectively with employers.
Unions become more and more strong in the sense that
they achieve favorable bargaining settlements with
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employers. The unions' main concerns are to raise wages for
their members, maintain job security, deal with work
allocation, deal with employee turn over, and fringe
benefits (i.e, life insurance, major medical benefits, and
paid vacation). Moreover, they may have an important role in
society. For example, a host of protective legislation,
including unemployment insurance, employment discrimination,
and employment safety and health laws are to be credited to
unions (Fiorito & Maranto, 1987, p. 16-17).
Despite the fact that unions contribute so much to
workers, their percentage of the labor force who are members
has declined. According to Fiorito (1987, p. 12), actually
union membership has continued to grow throughout most of
-±he past 30 years, but at a slower rate than of employment
growth. During the past several years, however, union
membership actually has declined.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study is to gain an understanding
of the state of unions in the United States. In particular,
to identify causes of the recent decline of union membership
in the United States from 1961 to 1989. Before the mid-1950s
the union membership was rising and reached a high of 26
percent of labor force as shown in Table 1, but since then
it has fallen to 14 percent of labor force in 1989 (Campbell

3

& Brue, 1992, p. 231). This study identifies and explains
some of the factors which might have contributed to union
membership decline.
The effects of administration and legislation,
structural change, managerial opposition, and the
substitution hypothesis are accepted by majority of
researchers. In addition, union internal factors, ideology
and values (Fiorito & Maranto, 1986, p. 14), and decline in
demand for union representation among non-union workers
(Farber, 1989) can also be considered. According to Freeman
(1986), the union wage differential is another cause for
decline in union membership. He further elaborates that wage
increase cause reduction in profits and thus are a minus to
management. Edward and Swaim (1983), in their study have
pointed out some other factors such as import competition,
deregulation, high unemployment, and the tightening
constraints of labor laws.
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Table 1
Union Membership in the United States
Selected Years (1900-1989)

Year

Union Membership
(1000s)

Percentage of
Labor Force

791
2,116
5,036
3,632
7,282
14,823
18,117
21,248
22,366
16,996
16,960

3
6

------------------------------------------------------1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
1950
1960
1970
1980
1985
1989

12
7

13
23
25
26
21
15
14

-------------------------------------------------------Note. From Contemporary Labor Economics (p.231)
by c. R. McConnell and
NewYork: McGraw-Hill.

s.

L. Brue, 1992,
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ALTERNATE EXPLANATIONS OF DECLINING
UNION MEMBERSHIP

Many studies have been published concerning the cause
of recent decline of union membership in the United States
for the past 30 to 35 years. The decline has been examined
as union density (Neuman & Rissman, 1984), relative change
in number of members (Stepina & Fiorito, 1986), union win
rates in certification (Seeber & Cook, 1983), and union
organizing effort (Voos, 1983). Several studies have
summarized the results of hundreds of empirical analyses.
Among them the following could be cited: 1) Administration
and legislation (Freeman, 1988), 2) Change in economic
structure (Farber, 1987), 3) Managerial opposition
(McConnell & Brue, 1992), 4) Union substitutability by
employers and government which cause decline in demand for
union representation among nonunion workers (Farber, 1989),
5) Union internal factors (Fiorito & Maranto, 1986), 6)
Import competition (Farber, 1989),and 7) Deregulation
(Edward & Swaim, 1983).

6

Administration and Legislation

Labor relations laws and regulations have some
influence on the unionism in the United States. But unions
in order to win legislation and pass their favorable bills
must have enough congressional votes. As a result unions
became politically active and seek to influence the
political market in several ways:
1) By propagandizing their members to vote in particular
ways.
2) By spending unions funds for low-income unregistered
persons, to encourage them to register and vote.
3) By contributing to pro-union candidates.

Generally~

labor was the leading contributor. to P.oli "t::ica.l campaigns,
but business has become the major contributor. For example,
in 1980 labor gave $13.1 million (24 percent) of the $55.3
million total Political.Action Committee (PAC)
contributions.
4) By allocating union resources, including staff-time,
and volunteer efforts to campaigns.
For the union political effort to be effective the
union-aided candidates have to win a reasonable proportion
of congressional seats. The history shows that union-favored
legislation has done well when the Democrats are in power
but poorly when Republicans are in power. For example as
American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial
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Organizations (AFL-CIO) reports show, labor won 78 percent
of bills from 1965 to 1968, when Lyndon Johnson was
president, compared with 49 percent from 1969 to 1972 whep
Richard Nixon was president. But because a bill favored by
unions is passed by congress does not mean that union
political power caused its passage.
On the other hand the bills passed by congress have a
significant effect on the union membership and their
bargaining power. According to McConnell & Brue (1992, p.
314), prior to 1930s, union organizers and members were
legally unprotected against employers or even government. So
the rise and fall of union membership during this period of
time are due to reasons other than legislation and
administrAtion .. For .example there is a sharp rise in union
membership that occured during the labor scarcity period
from 1917 to 1920. Then there was a reduction from about 5
million to around- 4 million during the deep depression of
1920-21. Later another decline in membership occured from
1929 to 1933 during the great depression from 3.4 million to
3 million (Troy, 1962).
During the 1930s, the union membership increase was
generally attributed to pro-union legislation. Several laws
were passed by Congress which placed a protective umbrella
over the union activities.
The Norris LaGuardia Act of 1932, invalidated the
yellow-dog contracts. These contracts required employees to
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agree as a condition of continued employment, not to join a
union. This Act also reduced the personal cost of becoming a
union member. Previously, the costs of joining a union might
be the loss of one's job. Also, the Act made it difficult
for employers to obtain injunctions against union activity.
So the unions' activities increased, 'such as strikes which
in turn caused employers offer higher wages. These higher
offers in turn, increased the incentive for workers to
become union members.
The Wagner Act of 1935, had even greater impact on
union membership. This legislation guaranteed unions the
right to self- organization, free of interference from
employers, and the right to bargain with employers. The· act
also listed a number of "unfair labor practices" on the part
of management,
Boar~

and established the National Labor Relation

(NLRB), which was given the authority to investigate

unfair labor practices occurring under the Act. The Wagner
Act enabled the American Federation of Labor (AFL) to
increase its power and also permitted the rapid growth of
industrial unions connected with the Congress of Industrial
Organization (CIO). The CIO unions organized millions of
less-skilled workers employed in mass-production industries
such as: steel, rubber, and automobiles. When the AFL and
the CIO merged in 1955, union membership in the two
organization had risen to about 17 million. The AFL-CIO
plays an important role in political action in elections and
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lobbying (McConnell & Brue, 1992, p. 227).
During 1940s and 1950s, the employment in previously
unionized manufacturing plants increased. This growing
strength of labor unions produced some difficulties for
employers. For example Teamsters engaged second boycotts in
which the union workers refused to make deliveries to nonunion establishments or to accept transfers of freight from
non-union carriers. So to avoid this, employers forced their
workers to join the Teamsters. These kinds of problems led
Congress to pass the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947. This
legislation contained some rules concerning "unfair labor
practices" on the part of unions. It prohibited: Coercion of
employees to become union members, Secondary boycotts
(refusing to buy or handle products produced by another
union or group of workers), Sympathy strikes (work stoppage
by one union designed to assist some other union in gaining
employer recognition or· some other objective), Excessive
union dues, and Featherbedding (forcing payment for work not
actually performed). These rules were intended to reduce
some of the excessive union power.
Union membership continued to grow slowly, until the
1980 decline (see Table 1). According to Freeman (1988, p.
78), Reagan administration's actions may have contributed to
the acceleration of the decline since 1970s. He also pointed
to one of the popular administration actions in the period
of the

Reagan presidency. In reaction to the Professional
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Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO) strike
President Reagan fired all of the striking controllers. This
in turn caused an antiunion climate in the business
community.

Structural Change

The distribution of employment in a number

of

dimensions has changed which could account for unionization
decline. Farber (1987, p. 916), presented change in the
economy by comparing the data of the years 1950,1977 and
1984. First, the fraction of civilian female employment, who
have historically been less unionized, increased from 29.4%
in 1950 to 40.5% in 1970 to 43.7% in 1984. Second, the
regional employment has shifted away from the historically
heavily unionized Northeast and North regions and toward the
historically less.unionized South. In 1950, 24.7% of the
nonagricultural labor force was in the South, and this
increased to 33% by 1984. Next, labor force shifted away
from heavily unionized blue-collar employment toward less
heavily unionized white-collar employment. In 1950 the
fraction of the labor force that was in blue-collar
employment was 40.5% and this fell to 34.4% by 1977.
Finally, the industrial composition of employment shifted
away from the traditionally heavily unionized manufacturing
and other goods-producing industries and toward the less
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heavily unionized service industries. In 1950 the fraction
of the nonagricultural labor force that was in serviceproducing industries was 59.1% and this rose to 70.5% by
1977 and to 74.0% by 1984 (Farber, 1987, p. 916).
In supporting the theory of shifting employment to the
southern regions Reder (1957) showed that after 1945, the
growth of low wage nonunion firms in southern areas may have
been assisted by a provision of the Taft-Hartley Act of
1947. Taft-Hartley Act made invalid, in any state
proscribing them, collective bargaining agreements requiring
union membership as a condition of employment (Right to work
laws).
In recent years, employment growth has been provided by
. _sma J J -.£irms which according to a number of studies_, are less

likely to be unionized than are large firms. Even and
Macp~erson

(1990), have estimated that declining plant size

accounted for 28 percent of the decline in unionism over the
1979-1983.
Another recent structural change in the United States
economy is the deregulation of some key heavily unionized
industries such as trucking, airlines, communication and
transportation. These industries have become much more
competitive since the government removed entry barriers and
rate regulation. In this more competitive environment firms
are likely to resist unionization more than in the past
because their market position is no longer protected by the
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government (Farber, 1987, p. 920).
Among the economists who agreed on the structural
change hypothesis are Fiorito & Maranto (1987) and Freeman
(1988). Troy (1990), also took

the same position in an

article entitled, "Is the United States Unique in the
Decline of Private Sector Unionism?" He argued that the
United States has led Canada and Europe in the substitution
of "High Tech" manufacturing (such as computer equipment,
semi conductors, and radio and television communication
equipment) for traditional manufacturing (such as steel and
automobiles). The result is that, in the United States there
has been an enormous substitution of nonunion white-collar
jobs for union blue-collar jobs as the structural change
hypothesis would suggest. However, he believes that
structural changes in labor markets began sooner,

proceed~d

more rapidly, and their scope was more extensive in the
United States than.in Canada and Western Europe. In union
terms, the nonunion labor market grew sooner and much more
rapidly in the United States than in Canada and Western
Europe.. Generally, he agrees with structural changes
hypothesis, and argues that structural change which have
occured in Canada and Western Europe have differed from
those in the United States Europe in both timing and
effectiveness.
There is some opposition to the structural change
hypothesis. As McConnell and Brue (1992, p. 223), pointed
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out there are other advanced capitalistic countries which
have experienced structural changes similar to those which
have occured in the United States. The unionization movement
in those countries continue to grow both absolutely and
relatively. Canada is the most important example.
Structural change could have an important role, but it can
not fully account for the decline in unionization.

Managerial Opposition

Freeman and Medoff (1984) believe that since the
beginning of 1970's unions have increased the union wage
advantage, which the nonunion workers enjoyed it as well.
Meanin_g these wc;ge increases are a minus to management. As a
result, union firms have become less profitable than
nonunion firms which in turn has caused managerial
opposition to unions to increase. This opposition takes a
variety of forms, both legal and illegal.
Legal antiunion tactics include: written and verbal
communications with workers, tactics to delay the NLRB union
certification election in order to reduce worker enthusiasm
for unionization, and hiring labor-management consultants
who specialize in

antiunio~

activities which encourage

workers not to join unions or to persuade union workers to
decertify their union (Freeman, 1986, p. 93). As shown in
Table 2, as the percentage of the role of supervision in the
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Table 2
Unions Success Rate in NLRB Elections

ROLE OF SUPERVISION IN THE
CAMPAIGNS (Percent of cases)

UNION SUCCESS RATE
(Percent)

-----------------------------------------------------------None (6)
100
Some (8)
Moderate (18)
Sizeable (36)
extreme (51)

70
57
20

33

-----------------------------------------------------------Note. From "The Effect of the Union Wage Differential
on Management Opposition and Union Organizing
Success" by R. B. Freeman, 1986, American
Economic Review. p. 93.
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campaigns or managerial opposition activities increased, the
union success rate decline.
Freeman and Medoff (1984) report that there has been. a
rise in the use of illegal antiunion tactics. In particular,
they argue that it has become increasingly common for
management to identify and dismiss leading prounion workers,
even though this is prohibited by the Wagner Act of 1935.
This act along with the other rules, prohibits antiunion
discrimination by employers in hiring, firing, and
promoting.
The increasing popularity of this tactic stems from the
fact that even when proved guilty, the employers receive
only light penalties. For example, employers who are found
guilty of firing union workers are forced to reinstate the
workers and to pay them limited back pay (The wages they .
would have received minus whatever income they received on
other jobs), often.several years later. In addition the
employers must post a notice that they will not engage in
such illegal activity again. Another reason for the growth
of illegal management opposition is that it is an
exceedingly effective way to chill an organizing campaign
(McConnell & Brue, 1992, p. 233).
Freeman (1984, p. 234-235) cited thirteen recent
studies on the impact of management antiunion activities
upon the outcomes of union elections. He observed that in
twelve of thirteen studies, management activity reduces
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union success in NLRB representation election.
A later study by Freeman (1988) presents two types of of
regression analyses (see Table 3). First, the time series.
regression to show the effect of unfair labor practices and
union wage premium on organizing success for the period of
1950-1980. For this purpose he chose real GNP, rate of
inflation, unemployment, and percentage of wage differential
as independent variables, and the unfair labor practices per
worker in NLRB election as dependent variable (column 1).
The

result showed that union wage differential had a

positive sign and is significant. This means that there is a
positive relationship between union wage differential and
unfair labor practice. He then add unfair labor practice to
the list of independent variables and.

to~k

the number of

workers organized per employment as the dependent

variabl~

(col1:1ffin 2). The regression result showed that there is a
negative relationship between the number of unfair labor
practices and workers organized per employment. Next he ran
another regression, taking the percentage wage differentials
as the. independent variable along with the other independent
variables. The number of workers organized per employment
was used as the dependent variable (column 3). The result
shows a negative relationship between them. In the same
paper he also estimated the effect of unfair labor practices
on organizing success in a pooled cross-section industry
file for the period 1965-80 over which industry data were
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Table 3
Estimated Effect of Union Wage Premium on
Unfair Labor Practice on Organization Success
Dependent Variable
Log(Unfair Labor
Practices Per Worker
in NLRB Election)
Independent
Variable

( 1)

Log(Number
of Workers
Employment)

( 2)

( 3)

============================================================

Constant

-4.3

-6.62

-5.8

Time

0.15
(0.04)
-0.002
(0.001)
-1.35
( 1. 43)

-0.08
(0.04)
-0.000
(0.001)
1.83
(1.52)
-0.05
(0.04)

-0.14
(0.04)
0.003
(0.001)
-2.07
( 1. 72)
0.02
(0.04)

Real GNP
Rate of Inflation
Unemployment Rate

0~.02

(0.04)
Percentage Wage
Differentials

2.45
( 1. 04)

Unfair Labor
Practice

-2.98
( 1.16)
-0.46
( 0. 2)

R-Squared

0.96

0.92

0.91

------------------------------------------------------------

Note. From " The Effect of the Union Wage Differential on
Management Opposition and Union Organizing Success"
by R. B. Freeman, 1986, American Economic Review.
p. 95.
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available. So the dependent variable was the number of
workers won from total employment and the independent
variables were unfair labor practices per election and
other variables such as producer price, profit and wages.
The result of regression showed a sizeable and significantly
negative impact of management opposition as measured by
unfair labor practices on union success.

Substitution Hypothesis

The union substitution thesis attributes union decline
to the fact that services provided by the union are
increasingly provided by employers and government. The
employer-union substitution thesis argues that through
various progressive human resource policies, employers have
"bought off" employee demand for union representation
(Fiorito & Maranto 1987). The employer union substitution
hypothesis is supported indirectly by numerous studies of
researchers. Farber and Saks (1980) found that relatively
well-paid employees are far less interested in voting for a
union. Employers, in order to satisfy employees, in addition
to paying attractive wages, do the following: establish twoway communication channels with workers, offer seniority
protection, create worker-participation schemes and pay
fringe benefits.
Farber (1989) examined data on worker attitudes toward
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unions for the time period of 1977 to 1984. He observed that
workers who are satisfied with their jobs are much less
likely to vote for union representation than are
dissatisfied workers.

In his research Farber focused on one

aspect, the trend in demand for union representation among
nonunion workers. For this purpose he selected the data from
the 1977 Quality of Employment Survey (QES), survey
conducted by Lewis Harris and Associates for the AFL-CIO in
1984, the 1980 wave of the National Longitudinal Survey of

Young men (NLSB), and the 1982 wave of the National
Longitudinal Survey of Young Women (NLSG). These four
surveys contain responses to a question (called VFU), which
asked

nonunion workers whether he/she would vote for union

representation on their current job if a secret ballot
election were held. The response to this question (NO=l,
YES=9) is interpreted as an indicator of the worker's demand
for unionization.-All the surveys also contain questions
regarding job satisfaction and union instrumentality to
increase wages. Simple tabulations of VFU among nonunion
worker~

show that 38.6 percent of 663 workers in the QES,

37.8 percent of 1242 workers in the NLSB, 43.5 percent of
1339 workers in the NLSG and 33.7 percent of 935 workers in

the AFL survey would vote for union representation. There is
no apparent trend, but preferences for union representation
are likely to be correlated with age, race, sex and year
that survey was conducted. So he decided to use a linear
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probability of worker desire for union representation given
the VFU results. The result showed that there is a
significant decline in demand for union representation frpm
1977 to 1984. Actually demand for union representation among
nonunion workers decline about 4.4 percent. To determine,
how much of this amount can be accounted for the increase in
job satisfaction and the decline in perception of union's
ability to increase wages or to improve jobs Farber (1989)
examined another model. In this model he took VFU as
dependent variable and SAT=l if the worker is satisfied with
job overall, SATPAY=l if the worker is satisfied with job
security, and UIMPW=l if worker feels that unions improve
wages and working conditions. The results show all four·
variables are strongly significant. If .we add all the
coefficients the result shows that all of the decline in
demand for union representation among nonunion workers
between 1977 and 1984 can be accounted for by the increase
in job satisfaction and decrease in perceptions of union
instrumentality. So employers activities to provide prounion
services was successful.
The government-union substitution thesis argues that
laws now provide protection once provided by unions.
Promoting civil rights, minimum wages, and unemployment
compensation are some of them (Fiorito'& Maranto 1987).
Neumann and Rissman (1984) also in their empirical analysis
concluded that government has been responsible for providing
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more "union-like" services which lessened the union
membership. These services as they mentioned are
unemployment insurance, social security and health and
safety laws.

The Internal Factors

The three hypothesis mentioned before do not cover all
the factors which might be contributing to the decline of
unionism. For example, there is some evidence to suggest
that union efforts to organize the unorganized have been
insufficient (Voos, 1983). Lipset (1986), notes that public
approval of unionism has declined steadily since the early
1950s. Lipset, ..by using United States-Canadian comparisons,
argues that Canadians are more receptive to collective
action.
On the other hand, American ideology is a faith in
laissez-faire, at least as it applies to business. Schneider
(1981) in his study mentioned that business does some good
for everyone in society, while unions act primarily to
benefit their members and leaders and have only a negative
impact on the rest of the public. Lipset (1986) argued the
"ideological

thesis", but he had no empirical evidence to

explain how it may affect the decline in unionization.
Stepina & Fiorito (1986, p. 250) showed that public opinion
changes in membership, but their results do not support
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Lipset's contention that public approval plays a dominant
role.
Some authors believe that declining union strength may
be due to internal union factors. Craft & Abboushi (1983)
found that nearly 75 percent of workers feel that union
leaders are self-serving and autocratic, and public
confidence in them is very low. Maranto & Fiorito (1987)
demonstrated that autocratic features in unions reduce union
success in certification elections. Freeman & Medoff (1984)
made evident that corruption among union leaders is as bad
as among business leaders.
At present, no evidence exists that the decline in
union density is due to internal union factors, but research
in this direction has just begun (Maranto & Fiorito, 1987).

Import Competition

Union activity to increase wages, raises the costs of
production. So it becomes more profitable to import rather
than producing some products in United States. Because
higher product prices will not be accepted by consumers who
have attractive foreign alternatives. According to Farber
(1989, p.919), some of the increase in imports is likely to
be due to the unions themselves, as they raise costs of
production. In 1958 only 2.5% of manufacturing sales in the
United States were imports. This rose to 7.2% by 1977 and to
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11% by 1984. In the past, American firms with no significant
foreign competition, could afford to accommodate higher
costs associated with labor unions by sharing some of the.
gains of a relatively closed economy with their workers.
However, the increased openness of the American economy has
reduced the gains to be shared and has made it prohibitly
expensive to bear these higher costs.

As a result, unions

lost some of their effectiveness to raise wages, and this
has reduced attraction of unions to union members.
As a result demand for protection from "unfair" foreign
competition by unions has become a major issue of national
economic policy (Branson, 1980, p. 189).
On the other hand the increase of the foreign direct
_in~e.s.t.ment

in the United States have also a negative effect

on the union membership. Foreign companies are not unionized
and as the amount of the foreign direct investment increase
the union membership as a whole decline.

Deregulation

Another factor contributing to the decline of union
membership is deregulation. This means that government
removed some rules which forbade the activities against
entry in to the industries. Deregulation increases
competition and so increase the cost disadvantage of union
operations. The popular example is transportation
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industries, notably freight hauling and airlines (Reder
1975, p.99). Before 1975 regulation of freight rates had
made it possible to pass forward the cost of union contracts
to customers without fear of competition from nonunion
firms.
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HYPOTHESIS

The purpose of this study is to identify causes of the
recent decline of union membership in the United States.
Some explanations for the contemporary decline in union
strength have been reviewed. Because of the lack of
information and data, it was decided to run an empirical
test using some of the variables noted in the review of
literature.
This study intends to show the effect of the number of
unfair labor practices, the number of female workers, the
number of part-time workers, the ratio of unemployed insured
by government divided by total unemployment, foreign direct
investment in the United States, and the effect of the
president's political party on the number of unionized
workers. The variables of unionized workers, female and
part-time workers, ·unemployed insured workers by government
can be measured in three ways: 1) As an absolute number, 2)
The percentage of labor force and, 3) Percentage change in
absolute number. Unfair labor practices and foreign direct
investment can also be measured in two ways: 1) As an
absolute number and, 2) As percentage change in absolute
number. The President's political party is used as a dummy
variable, and it is expected to have a positive relationship
with the dependent variable. As discussed earlier in this
study, all other independent variables have a negative
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effect on the strength of unionization. So it is expected
that the regression will show negative relationship between
them and the dependent variable.
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METHODOLOGY

For the formal test of the hypothesis, the study used
three time series regression analyses for the time period
from 1961 to 1989.
The first regression model is as follow:

UW = a + blABSF + b2ABSPT + b3ABSDI +
b5ABSIU

b4ABSULP +

+ b6PPP + ei

UW = Percentage of unionized workers to total labor force.
ABSF = Absolute number of female workers.
ABSPT = Absolute number of part-time workers.
ABSDI = Absolute amount of foreign direct investment in the
United States.
ABSULP = Absolute number of unfair labor practices filed by
unions.
ABSIU = Absolute number of insured unemployed by government.
PPP = Dummy variable of political party of president; X=O
(If Republican) and X=l (If Democrat).
The second regression model is as follow:

uw

= a + blF + b2PT + b3DI + b4ULP + b5IU + PPP + ei

UW = Amount of unionized workers as the percentage of labor
force.
F = Percentage of female workers in the total labor force.
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= Percentage

PT

of part-time workers in the total labor

force.

= Percentage

DI

change of foreign direct investment in the

United States.
ULP

= Percentage

change of unfair labor practice filed by

unions.

= Number

IU

of insured unemployed paid by government divided

by total unemployment.
PPP

= Dummy

variable of president political party; X=O (If

Republican) and X=l (If Democrat).
The third regression model is as follow:

UW = a + blF + b2DI + b3ULP + b4IU + bSPPP + ei
The Variables in .:this regression are the same as the second
regression without the percentage of part-time workers to .
total labor force (PT).

Data

The data (from 1961-1989) for this study were gathered
from the Economic Report of the President, Statistical
Abstract of the United States, National Labor Relations
Board Annual Report, and Monthly Labor Review.
'
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS

Three time series regression analyses were used to
determine some of the causes of the recent decline of union
membership in the United States. The result of first
regression is shown in Table 4. The Coefficient of
determination CR-Squared) is 0.9300 which implies that 93%
of decline in union membership is explained by the
independent variables. The regression results imply the
following:
a) There is not a significant but a positive
relationship between the absol4te number of female workers
and percentage of unionized workers. Also there is a
negative and signi£ic.ant relationship between the absolute
number of part-time workers and the absolute number of
unionized workers which support our hypothesis.
b) The increase in absolute amount of foreign direct
investment in the United States caused an insignificant
increase in union membership.
c) To show the impact of managerial opposition the
absolute number of unfair labor practice filed by unions
have been chosen. The result shows a highly significant and
positive relationship wi_th }:he absolute number of unionized
workers. The logic behind it might be that as the union
membership decline, the number of unfair labor practice
decline with it.
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Table 4
Results of the First Regression Model

lt,s // Dependent Variable is UW
l>ate: 12-03-1993 I Time: 15:35
IMPL range: 1961 - 1989
•umber of ~bservations: 29

========================================================================
COEFFICIENT STD. ERROR
T-STAT.
2-TAIL SIG.
VARIABLE
============================================================~~==========

c

ABSF
ABS PT
ABSDI
AB SU LP
ABSIU
PPP

32.791052
1.681E-05
-0.0017766
7.855E-06
0.0003667
0.0001109
;..2.5477348

1.8741756
0.0003235
0.0007566
3.492E-05
5.848E-05
0.0004774
0.5733167

17.496254
0.0519581
-2.3479270
0.2249765
6.2706363
0.2322759
-4.4438521

0.0000
0.9590
0.0283
0.8241
0.0000
0.8185
0.0002

-----------------------------------------------------------------------Hean of dependent var
0.930068
20.78276

~-----------------------------------------------------------------------

I-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Log likelihood
Durbin-Watson stat

0.910995
1.169782
-41.69125
. 1.905148

S.D. of dependent var
Sum of squared resid

F-statistic
Prob CF-statistic)

3.921012
30.10459
48.76493
0.000000

=======================================================================~
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d) In order to show the substitutability effect,
absolute number of insured unemployed have been chosen. The
result shows a positive and not significant relationship
between number of covered workers and the absolute number of
unionized workers, which does not support our hypothesis.
The reason might be because unemployment insurance payment
by the government is a small portion of the large
governmental payments, so it can not be a good proxy for the
regression model. The positive relationship may exist,
because both of the variables were declining in the past 30
years.
e) The result shows a very significant effect of
president political party on union membership., It was
expected that during the Republican presidency union
membership would decline and the negative sign of
coefficient supports this hypothesis.
The Durbin-Watson stat of 1.90 shows that there is not
an·autocorrelation problem. This problem occurs when
significant explanatory variables are not included in the
regression equation or if a non-linear relationship exist.
Another reason may be because the randomness of error term
is violated which means that the error term in one year is
somehow related to the error term in the previous year.
Multicollinearity problem occurs when there is a high
degree of intercorrelation among some or all of the
explanatory variables in the regression equation. This can
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be checked for by running COVA on the TSP program and
checking the correlation among the independent variables. In
this study there appears to be a high degree of correlatipn
between absolute number of female workers with absolute
number of part-time workers and foreign direct investment.
To correct this problem it might either change the
combination of variables, using a proxy for one of the
variables, or using a greater number of observations.
The results of the second regression (see Table 5),
shows that only percentage of female workers and part-time
workers to total labor force, and president political party
have negative relationship with the percentage of unionized
workers. Other independent variables have positive
relationship with de_pendent variable which.. reject our
hypothesis. The T-stat values shows that only percentage
chan~e

in foreign direct investment and insured unemployed

to total unemployment are statistically significant at 5%
level of confidence.
Because of the high degree of intercorrelation between
the percentage of female workers to total labor force and
percentage of part-time workers to total labor force (see
Table 6), it was decided to run the third regression. The
variables in this regression are same as the variables which
were used in the second regression except the percentage of
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Table 5
Results of Second Regression Model

LS II Dependent Variable is UW
Date: 12-03-1993 I Time: 15:41
SMPL range: 1961 - 1989
Number of observations: 29

-----------------------------------------------------------------------COEFFICIENT
STD. ERROR
VARIABLE
T-STAT.
2-TAIL SIG.
~----------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------8.3962229
c
27.815958
3.3129132
0 ..0032
F

~0.4569048

PT
DI
ULP
IU

-0.0065864
0.0204016
0.0300786
23.854362
-0.2423724

PPP

0.3405038
0.7075388
0.0073938
0.0806162
7.4226494
0.9745195

-1.3418495
-0.0093089
. 2.7592684
0.3731088
3.2137260
-0.2487096

0.1933
0.9927
- 0.0114
0.7126
0.0040
0.8059

-----------------------------------------------------------------------Mean of dependent var
20.78276
0.800273

R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Log likelihood
Durbin-WatsQn stat

0.745802
1.976898
-56.90788
0.848917

S.D. of dependent var
Sum of squared resid
F-statistic
Prob(F-sta~istic)

3.921012
85.97876
14.69172
0-.000001

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------~--------------- --------------------------------------------
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Table 6
Covariance Results of the Second Regression Model

Date: 12-03-1993 / Time: 15:44
SMPL range: 1961 - 1989
Number of observations: 29

========================================================================
Variable ·
S.D.
Mean
Maximum
Minimum
========================================================================
uw
3.9210120
20.782759
25.700000
13.700000
F

PT
DI
ULP
IU
PPP

39.606896
15.465517
40.044828
2.0079310
0.4354828
0.4137931

3.8240716
1.6793442
57.169051
·6.1934773
0.0842651
0.5012300

45.100000
18.300000
195.00000
11.100000
0.6350000
1.0000000

33.500000
12.400000
-45.300000
-18.750000
0.2990000
0.0000000

-----------------------------------------------------------------------Covariance
Correlation
-----------------------------------------------------------------------UW,UW
14.844186
1.0000000
UW,F
UW,PT
UW,DI
UW,.ULP
UW,IU
UW,PPP
F,F
F,PT
F,DI
F,ULP
F,IU
F,PPP
PT,PT
PT,DI
PT,ULP
PT,IU
PT,PPP
DI,DI
DI,ULP
DI,IU
DI ,PPP
ULP,ULP
ULP,IU
ULP,PPP
IU,IU
IU,PPP
PPP,PPP

-10.961606
-4.0;)68015
44.470423
.. 13.621999
0.2380531
0.6243758
14.119264
5.7067898
6.2565993
-11.006815
-0.1898344
-1.0683711
2.7229486
-4.3167318
-4.7265182
-Q.0553247
-0.4891795
3155.6004
69.986338
, -0.8601974
-5.5116528
37.036431
0.2600520
0.7567182
0.0068558
0.0118002
0.2425684

-0.7571640
-0.6380957
0.2054717
0.5809625
0.7462214
0.3290416
l.0000000
0.9203778
0.0296409
-0.4813279
-0.6101558
-0.5772966
1.0000000
:..o.0465687
-0.4706597
-0.4049221
-0.6019098
1.0000000
0.2047188
-0.1849393
-0.1992158
1.0000000
0.5160808
0.2524658
1.0000000
0.2893648
1.0000000

========================================================================
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part-time workers to total labor force.
The result of this regression (see Table 7), shows that
the variable of female workers is significant as expected.•
There is also a negative relationship between female workers
and unionized workers which support the structural change
hypothesis. Besides, the percentage change of foreign direct
investment and insured unemployed to total unemployment are
significant and have positive relationship with percentage
of unionized workers. The percentage change of unfair labor
practice turned out to have a positive but significant
effect on the percentage of unionized workers. President's
political party as expected has a negative relationship with
the dependent variable but is insignificant.
The results of Durbin-Watson statistics in the both
second and third regressions show an autocorrelation
problem.
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Table 7
Results of the Third Regression Model
LS // Dr:;?endent \rariable is vw
Date: 12-03-1993 / Time: 15:51
SMPL range: 1961
1989
Number of observations: 29

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -----------VARIABLE
COEFFICIENT
STD. ERROR
T-STAT.
2-TAIL SIG.
====================================================================~===

c

27.841079
-0.4597479
0.0204053
0.0302807

F

DI
ULP
IU

I

PPP

~3.818194

-Q.2403976

7.7760029
0.1472387
0.0072206
0.0759306
6.1855567
0.9302461

3.5803843
-3.1224653
2.8260020
0.3987949
3.8506144
-0.2584237

0.0016
0.0048
0.0096
0-.6937
0.0008
"o'. 7984

-----------------------------------------------------------------------0.800272
Mean of dependent var
.20. 78276

R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Log likelihood
Durbin-Watson stat

0.756853
1.933448
-56.90794
0.849611

S.D. of dependent var
Sum of squared resid
F-statistic
· Prob(F-statistic)

"3.921012
85.97910
18.43135
0.000000

========================================================================
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CONCLUSIONS

Unions have mainly two important functions, which

ar~

to organize the unorganized labor and negotiate collective
bargaining agreements. In the United States unionized sector
is the minority component of the labor force. Most recently
this amount started to decline and reached 14 percent of the
civilian labor force.
In this study some of the causes of the recent decline
in union membership in the United States were discussed.
Among the hypothesized causes which were proposed by the
majority of researchers the following were tested. The
effect of percentage of female workers to total labor force,
percentage of part-time workers to total labor force as the
measure for structural change in the composition of work
force. In addition, percentage change in foreign direct
investment in the.United States was used to show the effect
of foreign competition on unionization. Percentage change in
unfair labor practices filed by unions was chosen as one
type of evidence of increasing managerial opposition.
Insured unemployed to total unemployment was used to examine
the effect of governmental substitution on the union
membership. Finally, the president's political party was
used to show the administration's and legislation's effects
on percentage of unionized workers to total labor force.
Three regression models using the percentage of
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unionized workers as dependent variable were tested. The
first regression used all the independent variables in
absolute terms, and the result suggest that only absolute.
number of part-time workers and president political party
have negative effect on the percentage of unionized workers.
The second regression used independent variables as the
percentage amount, and dependent variable, as the percentage
of unionized workers. The results showed the negative effect
of percentage of female workers to total labor force,
percentage of part-time workers to total labor force and
president political party on the dependent variable.
Because of the high degree of intercorrelation between
the two variables of female and part-time workers in the
second regression, it was decided to run the third
regression. The variables in this regression are similar to
the ones which were used in the second regression except for
the percentage of· part-time workers. The results show a
negative effect of percentage of female workers to total
labor force on the percentage of unionized workers. So by
removi~g

one variable the multicollinearity problem is

removed.

Suggestions for Further Research

The regression model will be significant and the least
squares would be an efficient procedure for estimating
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coefficient of the regression model if there were no
problem. In this study results of the three regression
models showed some insignificant variables, and also some of
them rejected our hypothesis. So this study can not be a
good determination for the decline in union membership in
the United States. Therefore further research is necessary
before any exact conclusion is made.
It is suggested to use new variables which might have
significant effects such as: union and nonunion wage
differentials, and rate of inflation.

Region, type of

industry, and job satisfaction can also be used as dummy
variables.
It may also be possible to utilize the data from
different industries and run a cross-sectional regression
analysis which could produce a more significant result.
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